An Adverbial Theory of ConsciousnessThomas, Alan (2003) An Adverbial Theory of Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2 (3). pp. 161-185. Full text available as:
AbstractThomas Nagel's criterion for an acceptable theory of conscious awareness, that it address the question of 'what it is like' to be a conscious mental subject has been misunderstood in the light of an implicit act/object model of conscious awareness. Kant's account of conscious experience is an adverbial theory precisely in the sense that it avoid such an act/object interpretation. An 'objectualist' and 'actualist' construal of views of conscious awareness are contrasted. The idea of an adverbial theory of conscious experience is further developed by examining recent re-interpretations of Brentano as an adverbial theorist (Thomasson) or as an identity theorist (Hossack). Identity theory is independently criticised as a free standing account of consciousness. Kant's adverbial view is further developed and extended to an account of self-ascription and self-knowledge. Comments/DiscussionA well known criteria for a theoretical account to capture the nature of consciousness, that it capture what it is like for the subject of conscious experience, is misunderstood because of the constraining structure of much contemporary philosophy of mind. This paper places Nagel's claim in the phenomenological tradition from Kant through Brentano in which it finds a natural place. The benefits of an adverbial construal of treating consciousness as a modification of the mental acts of persons are explored.
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