Phenomenal concepts and higher-order experiencesCarruthers, Peter (2004) Phenomenal concepts and higher-order experiences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68. pp. 316-336. Full text available as:
AbstractRelying on a range of now-familiar thought-experiments, it has seemed to many philosophers that phenomenal consciousness is beyond the scope of reductive explanation. Others have thought that we can undermine the credibility of those thought-experiments by allowing that we possess purely recognitional concepts for the properties of our conscious mental states. This paper is concerned to explain, and then to meet, the challenge of showing how purely recognitional concepts are possible if there are no such things as qualia – in the strong sense of intrinsic (non-relational, non-intentional) properties of experience. It argues that an appeal to higher-order experiences is necessary to meet this challenge, and then deploys a novel form of higher-order thought theory to explain how such experiences are generated. Comments/DiscussionThis paper is about how best to explain the concepts that we can apply to our own experiences, and which then figure in zombie and other thought-experiments.
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