Suffering without subjectivity

Carruthers, Peter (2004) Suffering without subjectivity. Philosophical Studies, 121. pp. 99-125.

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Abstract

This paper argues that it is possible for suffering to occur in the absence of phenomenal consciousness - in the absence of a certain sort of experiential subjectivity, that is. (‘Phenomenal’ consciousness is the property that some mental states possess, when it is like something to undergo them, or when they have subjective feels, or possess qualia.) So even if theories of phenomenal consciousness that would withhold such consciousness from most species of non-human animal are correct, this needn’t mean that those animals don’t suffer, and aren’t appropriate objects of sympathy and concern.

Comments/Discussion

This paper argues that suffering can occur in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. So even if (some) animals lack the latter, they can still undergo the former.

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