Kant, McDowell and the Theory of ConsciousnessThomas, Alan (1997) Kant, McDowell and the Theory of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy, 5 (3). pp. 283-305. Full text available as:
Alternative URL: http://www.logical-operator.com/cvpage.html AbstractAn examination of John McDowell's 'Kantian" treatment of perceptual consciousness in Mind and World. It is argued that McDowell misguidedly conflates Kant's account of inner sense and apperception and consciousness with self-consciousness. This leads to an unacceptable account of the normative governance of thought and a denial of animal mindedness. A view closer to Kant's own is described: an adverbial theory of consciousnes in which consciousness is a mode of a mental state. The view is defended from regress or circularity. Comments/DiscussionThis paper describes an historically important approach to conscious experince that attempts to finesse the distinction between first order and second order approaches. A very welcome attempt to apply a historical view, Kant's, to contemporary work on perceptual consciousness is assessed and supplemented.
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