Crossmodal interactions: lessons from synesthesiaSagiv, Noam and Ward, Jamie (2006) Crossmodal interactions: lessons from synesthesia. In: Visual Perception, Part 2 - Fundamentals of Awareness: Multi-Sensory Integration and High-Order Perception. Progress in Brain Research, Volume 155. Elsevier, pp. 259-271. ISBN 0444519270 Full text available as:
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0079-6123(06)55015-0 Alternative URL: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?db=pubmed&cmd=Retrieve&dopt=AbstractPlus&list_uids=17027393&query_hl=8&itool=pubmed_docsum AbstractSynesthesia is a condition in which stimulation in one modality also gives rise to a perceptual experience in a second modality. In two recent studies we found that the condition is more common than previously reported; up to 5% of the population may experience at least one type of synesthesia. Although the condition has been traditionally viewed as an anomaly (e.g., breakdown in modularity), it seems that at least some of the mechanisms underlying synesthesia do reflect universal crossmodal mechanisms. We review here a number of examples of crossmodal correspondences found in both synesthetes and nonsynesthetes including pitch-lightness and vision-touch interaction, as well as cross-domain spatial-numeric interactions. Additionally, we discuss the common role of spatial attention in binding shape and color surface features (whether ordinary or synesthetic color). Consistently with behavioral and neuroimaging data showing that chromatic-graphemic (colored-letter) synesthesia is a genuine perceptual phenomenon implicating extrastriate cortex, we also present electrophysiological data showing modulation of visual evoked potentials by synesthetic color congruency. Comments/DiscussionIn this chapter we review a series of recent studies concerning synesthesia - a condition in which stimulation in one modality evoked additional experiences in a second modality. We attempt to bridge different levels of description: experience, cognitive processes, and neural activity underlying the condition. Any theory of conscious perception must explain not only how the mind works but also possible deviations from norm. This seemingly anomalous phenomenology of perception provides an interesting test case for such theories.
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