The Turing machine revisited: The computational complexity of a visually conscious machine. Can a conscious machine exist?

Rosen, Alan and Rosen, David B. (2007) The Turing machine revisited: The computational complexity of a visually conscious machine. Can a conscious machine exist? In: 11th annual meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, 22-25 Jun 2007, Las Vegas.

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Abstract

In this paper the authors prove that a conscious machine can exist and specify the conditions that must be satisfied for its existence. Alan Turing demonstrated, in his 1950 paper (Mind 59:433-460), with calculations, the infeasibility of cognitive machines when explicit programming was their only knowledge acquisition tool (cognition could be achieved only with the addition of an interpreter and humanized interfaces). The authors show that Turing’s main principles, the addition of an interpreter and humanized interfaces, may be replaced by sequential algorithmic programming when the modalities of receptors are taken into consideration. These modalities lead to a fundamental law in biology - the law of specific nerve energy - that relates consciousness to explicit neuronal activity (Neuronal Correlate of Modality). This law may be used to prove that “conscious” machines can exist, and can exhibit forms of consciousness similar to human consciousness. The design of such a conscious machine, a tactile-visual humanoid robotic machine, has already been implemented (Rosen & Rosen, www.mcon.org and ASSC E-archive). The tactile-visual system, that simulates human visual cognition, is designed with explicit programming as the only knowledge-acquisition tool. All the explicit programming of the machine is performed with a finite, non-exponential number of steps, according to physical-optical laws. Furthermore, the machine may experience the subjective experiences of “seeing” or “feeling” the objects that it interacts with.

Comments/Discussion

The modality of a sensory receptor is defined in all medical and neuroscience textbooks, as the "subjective experience" sensation evoked by the receptor. In this paper the authors assume that the "subjective experience" sensation is a "conscious" sensation. And by extension that all conscious sensations are subjective experiences, experienced only by the subject.

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