Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An Active Perception Approach to Conscious Mental Content

Thomas, Nigel J.T. (1999) Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An Active Perception Approach to Conscious Mental Content. Cognitive Science, 23 (2). pp. 207-245.

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Abstract

Can theories of mental imagery, conscious mental contents, developed within cognitive science throw light on the obscure (but culturally very significant) concept of imagination? Three extant views of mental imagery are considered: quasi-pictorial, description, and perceptual activity theories. The first two face serious theoretical and empirical difficulties. The third is (for historically contingent reasons) little known, theoretically underdeveloped, and empirically untried, but has real explanatory potential. It rejects the "traditional" symbolic computational view of mental contents, but is compatible with recent situated cognition and active vision approaches in robotics. This theory is developed and elucidated. Three related key aspects of imagination (non-discursiveness, creativity, and seeing as) raise difficulties for the other theories. Perceptual activity theory presents imagery as non-discursive and relates it closely to seeing as. It is thus well placed to be the basis for a general theory of imagination and its role in creative thought.

Comments/Discussion

The article develops an empirically informed theory of mental imagery that (unlike the better known theories in the literature, such as the quasi-pictorial theory of Kosslyn, and the "propositional" theory of Pylyshyn) provides an explanation of the fundamentally intentional and conscious nature of the phenomenon, as well as elucidating the conceptual links between imagery, imagination (in its broader sense), and creative thinking. It also outlines a view of perception that is consonant with (and in some respects both anticipates and supplements) more recent work by others (such as O'Regan and Noë) on enactive theories of perceptual consciousness.

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