Memory and consciousness

Droege, Paula (2007) Memory and consciousness. In: 11th annual meeting of the ASSC, 22-25 June 2007, Las Vegas, Nevada USA.

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Abstract

In considering the relation between memory and consciousness, we can begin with three questions: 1. What is common among memories? 2. How does representation figure in memory? 3. Is memory representationally higher-order, and if so, is this evidence in favor of a higher-order theory of consciousness? Drawing on psychological literature about memory, we can identify four types of memory: skill-based, semantic, declarative and episodic. Only the last form, episodic memory, is interestingly related to consciousness, and only this form is representationally higher-order. This connection seems to favor a higher-order theory of consciousness. However, episodic memory involves a representation of past mental states within a conscious mental state; that is, the higher-order structure is internal to the conscious state. Since the higher-order thoughts that explain conscious states are external to them, the coincidence between episodic memory and higher-order representation does not constitute a reason to adopt higher-order theories of consciousness. A temporal representation theory of consciousness provides a better account. Thinking about how we utilize past information in the present illuminates the role of temporal information in conscious representation and the ways in which temporal information may be irrelevant and so unrepresented, and so unconscious.

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