Awareness and novelty in explicit(deliberative) and implicit(evocative)learning and memory of artificial grammarDulany, Donelson E. and Pritchard, Evan (2007) Awareness and novelty in explicit(deliberative) and implicit(evocative)learning and memory of artificial grammar. In: 11th annual meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, 21-24 June 2007, Las Vegas, NV, USA. Full text available as:
AbstractContrary to standard theories of unconscious implicit learning, a mentalistic theory (Dulany, 1997) holds the following: Implicit learning establishes associative-activational links between conscious sub-propositional representations (evocative mental episodes), for example, those linking aspects of a letter string with its grammatical classification. With this specificity, transfer should be limited to later presentation of old letter sequences within old letter sets. Explicit learning, however, through testing consciously represented propositional hypotheses (deliberative mental episodes), should with explicit memory inferentially transfer to novel sequences within old letter sets, and to novel letter strings if there is conscious insight into novel-old letter relations. Comments/DiscussionThis experimental work selectively supports a theory of explicit and implicit learning that gives a central and essential role to conscious states and contents in both forms of learning--consistent with a broader mentalistic metatheory in which conscious states are the sole carriers of symbolic representations. The mental episodes in these two kinds of learning differ in the forms of conscious contents (propositional and sub-propositional) and in the forms of non-conscious mental operations (deliberative and evocative), both then maintained in, and activated from, nonsymbolic neural networks.
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