Cartesian epistemology: is the theory of the self-transparent mind innate?

Carruthers, Peter (2008) Cartesian epistemology: is the theory of the self-transparent mind innate? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15.

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Abstract

This paper argues that a Cartesian belief in the self-transparency of minds might actually be an innate aspect of our mind-reading faculty. But it acknowledges that some crucial evidence needed to establish this claim hasn’t been looked for or collected. What we require is evidence that a belief in the self-transparency of mind is universal to the human species. The paper closes with a call to anthropologists (and perhaps also developmental psychologists), who are in a position to collect such evidence, encouraging them to do so.

Comments/Discussion

If conscious thoughts are thoughts that we know ourselves to possess immediately, without self-interpretation, then the conclusion of the article is that while there are no conscious thoughts, we may be innately determined to believe that there are.

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